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Abstract: After the rise of Darwin’s theory of evolution it seemed that the much-feared ghost 
of traditional essentialism had disappeared from biology. However, developments of the last 
century in analytic metaphysics (Kripke, Putnam, Wiggins) appear to have resurrected the 
Aristotelian monster in various forms. The aim of this paper is to investigate the revival of the 
essentialist doctrine as applied to biological species, namely the thesis that organisms belong 
to a particular natural kind in virtue of possessing certain essential properties, and examine to 
what extent these new biological essentialisms are sustainable. For this purpose, I intend to 
analyze these proposals in both their forms, relational essentialism (Okasha, LaPorte) and 
intrinsic essentialism (Devitt), and confront them with their main anti-essentialist criticisms. 
The answer, I advance, is that natural kind essentialism as applied to biological taxa is, not only 
tenable, but theoretically adequate. Yet not in its typical variants. I contend that understood as 
HPC kinds (Boyd, Wilson), organisms possess clusters of co-occurring properties that are 
caused by various mechanisms which in turn determine the shared similarities that define 
membership to species. Such an approach encompasses both the intrinsic and relational 
mechanisms that make species members be what they are. However, this theory faces criticisms 
regarding circularity and the problem of polymorphism (Ereshefsky & Matthen). I suggest that 
reinterpreting the HPC theory as informationally-connected property clusters (Martínez) 
solves the objection posing an improved version of the HPC theory and providing what I 
believe is a theoretically adequate and explanatorily robust version of biological essentialism. 
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Introduction: State of play 
 
The classical idea that biological taxa have essences that determine their membership to a 
species has been widely rejected by most twentieth-century philosophers of biology. The 
advent of Darwinism along with the progress in methods of biological classification seemed to 
have shown that traditional essentialism was little more than metaphysical verbiage. Authors 
such as Ernst Mayr (1963), David Lee Hull (1965, 1978), and Michael T. Ghiselin (1974) 
famously defended the view that essentialism about species contradicted both evolutionary 
theory and modern taxonomy. Until not long ago this had been the dominant position in the 
species debate. However, Putnam’s (1973, 1975) and Kripke’s (1980) metaphysical revolution 
showed that essentialism was not only a fairly intuitive theory but also a position worth 
defending. Thus, the debate gradually resurfaced giving rise to new forms of essentialism as 
applied to species. Philosophers like Samir Okasha (2002) Joseph LaPorte (1997, 2004) and 
Paul Griffiths (1999) have rejected the traditional account advocating a relational approach to 
essentialism. Some, like Denis Walsh (2006) and Michael Devitt (2008) have criticized these 
approaches staying faithful to the intrinsic-type essentialism, while others such as Richard 
Boyd (1999) and Robert Wilson (1999) have proposed to understand natural kinds as 
homeostatic property clusters (HPC). Yet anti-essentialism remains combative, Marc 
Ereshefsky (2007, 2010a) has raised multiple objections to each of these theories. The purpose 
of this article is to analyze these new forms of biological essentialism and confront them with 
their criticisms. My task will be to determine if natural kind essentialism as applied to 
biological species is plausible or if, on the contrary, anti-essentialists are right and biology 
would do well to abandon such metaphysical relic. The answer, I advance, is affirmative, 
biological essentialism is worthy of defence. 
 The first section will be dedicated to clarify some of the essentialist notions and differentiate 
traditional essentialism from that which we ought to examine. This will be in line with one of 
the theses I stand by, scilicet that we must abandon the traditional sense of essence if we are to 
accommodate an appropriate metaphysics of biology. In section two I will proceed to enquire 
into the classic anti-essentialist criticisms. I will investigate the ontological question of 
biological taxa and present the species as individuals' concept (SAIC) defended by Hull and 
Ghiselin. Eventually I argue that the SAIC theory has no real impact on the species and natural 
kind debate. The reasons for considering species as individuals are not critical to essentialism, 
and additionally, the SAIC theory poses an inadequate model of natural laws and scientific 
procedure. So, the benefits are none and yet the costs many. Once this is done, we will go on 
to analyze the new forms of biological essentialism. In section three I present Okasha’s and 
LaPorte’s relational essentialisms as well as Devitt’s response in terms of his new intrinsic 
essentialism. Eventually, we will see that relational essentialism does not hold and that Devitt’s 
position, although adequate to our project, requires a little more precision. With this in mind in 
section four I will introduce the HPC theory, which extends over Devitt’s notion of property 
cluster and accounts for species as natural kinds encompassing both the intrinsic and relational 
mechanisms that make species members be what they are. Nonetheless, as we will see the HPC 
theory faces relevant criticism regarding circularity (Ereshefsky) and the problem of 
polymorphism (Ereshefsky & Matthen). I face those criticisms and propose that rather than 
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abandoning the theory, what we need to do is reinterpret it. Specifically, I argue that 
reinterpreting HPC kinds as informationally-connected property clusters (ICPC) in the way 
Martinez (2015) does allows us to solve the objections paving the way for what I believe is a 
theoretically adequate and explanatorily robust version of biological essentialism. 
 
1. A preliminary note on essentialism 
 
Essentialism is historically and philosophically linked to Greek and Medieval philosophy. In 
its original form it is derived from the Platonic characterization of the forms, a notion that 
would later take the shape of the scholastic debate of universals between realists and 
nominalists. However, the notion of essence is particularly rooted in the Aristotelian notion of 
substance and “what it is to be” something1. Later the concept of essence would freely navigate 
the seas of metaphysics until encountering Darwin, the post-Popperian philosophy of science 
and Quine. The tale goes like this: Under the influence of classical philosophy pre-Darwinian 
biology maintained a traditional essentialist concept of species. Natural kinds, of which 
biological organisms were believed to be part, were defined by the possession of underlying 
intrinsic properties that determined membership to specific groups. Traditional metaphysics 
believed essences to be eternal and immutable since these were the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of “what it is to be” something. This resulted in the typological species concept of 
pre-Darwinian taxonomy. Species were understood as static groups whose members shared 
some characteristics that differentiated them from other species. As one may guess Darwin’s 
evolutionary theory proved typologists wrong. If species mutated and evolved over time, they 
could not be defined by eternal intrinsic properties. Biological variability was at odds with 
traditional kind essentialism. This led to the post-Darwinian population thinking and the 
development of different classificatory theories such as phenetics, cladistics and evolutionary 
taxonomy2. However, a metaphysical revolution that would bring back the much-feared ghost 
of essentialism was about to take place.  
During the late 70’s at the centre of a debate in principle far from the philosophy of biology 
Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam proposed their semantic theories regarding reference and 
meaning. Both authors argued in favour of the existence of a posteriori necessities and semantic 
externalism. According to them the reference of natural kind terms does not depend exclusively 
on internal factors, but also on external ones. In Naming and Necessity Kripke worked through 
the famous example of Hesperus and Phosphorus, arguing that identity statements are, if true, 
always true. This led him to the consequence that the reference of certain type of terms which 
Kripke labelled rigid designators is fixed through all possible worlds. These terms, which 
include proper names and natural kind terms, designate the same object in all possible worlds 
in which that object exists. Applied to natural kind terms such as “gold” or “water” we get that 
 
1 It is worth to note, as Wilkins (2013) does, that the word “essence” was never properly used by Aristotle. The 
word was popularized after the reinterpretation of Averroes and Avicena and the later latinization of the 
Aristotelian work. 
2 Phenetics and cladistics differ in that pheneticists ignore phylogenetic relationships and classify biological 
organisms based solely on morphological similarity, whereas cladists categorize organisms in groups based on 
their most recent ancestor. Evolutionary taxonomy appeared after the development of the evolutionary theory and 
combined both offspring relationship and degree of evolutionary change. For a better approach to these taxonomic 
theories and their respective disagreements I recommend reading Hull (1988). 
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statements such as “gold = the element with the atomic number 79” or “water = H2O” are, if 
true, necessarily true. Virtually this implied that any substance designated by the term gold 
must necessarily, and thus essentially, possess the property of being composed of the element 
with the atomic number 79. Putnam’s twin earth experiment went in the same direction 
demonstrating that the reference of the term “water” is fixed and, what is more important, that 
this reference is determined by the essential property of being composed of H2O. The important 
thing to keep in mind when it comes to the species debate is that Kripke and Putnam both 
argued that these underlying properties play a causal-explanatory and semantic role. We 
individuate natural kinds in virtue of a series of contingent characteristics, such as being 
yellow, shinny, melting at 1.064 °C, etc. in the case of gold. These characteristics are caused 
by internal properties that are inductively explanatory and determine what things belong to 
what kind. As far as the chemical kinds are concerned this is not so controversial, but as one 
might expect the revival of essentialism had a major impact on the debate concerning biological 
taxa. The issue is further accentuated if one considers that both Kripke and Putnam made use 
of biological examples such as tigers and lemons to argue in favour of a posteriori necessities 
and kind essentialism.  
That being said, before continuing, two clarifications must be made so as not to lose our way. 
First of all, there is an important and often neglected difference between individual and kind 
essentialism. Individual essentialism has to do with the properties that make a certain individual 
be what it is, properties without which that particular individual would cease to exist as the 
kind of thing it is. In other words, whereas individual essentialism claims that there is a property 
according to which an individual belongs to a certain kind, kind essentialism holds that it is the 
actual kind that possesses the essential properties that determine membership. The difference 
is subtle but crucial. The first claim strongly suggests the second while the second, although 
consistent with the first, does not imply it3. Wiggins (1980, 2001) has defended an essentialism 
along these lines4. This work delves in the question of kind essentialism and its relation to the 
species debate, and although interaction between these two doctrines will emerge, they should 
not be confused. The second clarification is that it is important to distinguish traditional 
essentialism from new biological essentialism. The distinction is important because much of 
the anti-essentialist consensus is a direct consequence of the confusion of these two positions5. 
Wilkins (2013) is right in stating that the stagnation of the pre-Darwinian concept of 
essentialism is largely due to Mayr and Hull’s treatment of biology in terms of traditional 
essences. Specifically, Hull’s criticism of typology under Popper’s notion of methodological 
essentialism. Hull (1965) listed the three essentialist tenets of typology as “(1) the ontological 
assertion that Forms exist, (2) the methodological assertion that the task of taxonomy as a 
science is to discern the essences of species, and (3) the logical assertion concerning 
 
3 To be precise, individual essentialism does not necessarily imply kind essentialism. But it is difficult to argue 
that individual entities possess the property of belonging to a kind without assuming that those same kinds have 
a list of conditions that determine membership. 
4 According to Wiggins the essence of an individual I is his necessary belonging to a kind K. The classic example 
is that being human is a necessary property of Socrates insofar as human, otherwise Socrates would cease to exist 
as the individual he is. Wiggins' idea has to do with how individuate objects making use of generic concepts 
known as sortals such as “human”.  
5 Aristotle’s essentialism does not consider essences to be properties, instead the essence of something is what 
determines the very being of that substance. That’s why essences are understood as being eternal and immutable. 
Aristotle described essences as the cause of being of individual substances. His primary interest was the question 
of what is responsible for the existence of an actual individual substance, rather than the question of why we 
classify individual substances in the way we do. 
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definition.” (Hull, 1965: 317). But as Wilkins notes, “these are not all the same, or even 
necessarily related, ideas, and it is not the case that these views must travel together as Hull 
insisted.” (Wilkins, 2013: 12). Traditional essentialism is ontological and definitional, it 
affirms that natural genres have intrinsic, eternal, ahistorical and immutable essences that make 
an object what it is. The new biological essentialism is not committed to these theses. Instead, 
with what it is committed is with the claim that there are internal properties that are relevant in 
understanding and explaining the causal processes that make an organism develop the traits 
that determine membership to a natural kind6. 
 
2. Old school anti-essentialism 
 
2.1 Natural kindness and species individualism 
 
As I said the canonical rejection of species essentialism followed from the advent of the 
Darwinian theory of evolution. Darwin proved that biological organisms were the product of 
natural selection and speciation processes. Biological variability was introduced and qualitative 
features were no longer considered to be necessary and sufficient for species membership. 
After the Darwinian revolution population thinking was stablished and species began to be 
understood as constant changing units. The evolutionary concept of species was inherited by 
Mayr (1962, 1969) who confronted typologist presenting his Biological Species Concept 
(BSC). The BSC defined species as sets of organisms that can successfully interbreed. Mayr's 
idea is interesting because, as opposed to traditional intrinsic essentialism, he stated that higher 
taxa are defined by extrinsic relational factors such as their ability to interbreed and generate 
fertile offspring. An idea that would later be rescued by relational essentialists. However, the 
BSC would not go unpunished and several criticisms would be launched at the reproductive 
notion of species mainly for assuming that organisms that cannot interbreed do not form stable 
lineages7. 
Darwin and Mayr’s work would lead several authors to question the ontological status of 
species. Among them stand out Ghiselin (1974) and Hull (1978) who denied the natural 
kindness of species advocating for the species as individuals concept (SAIC), a theory that has 
often been cited by contemporary anti-essentialists as a compelling reason to discredit 
biological essentialism8. Ghiselin would be the first to formulate the idea, although it was Hull 
 
6 For a better analysis of the genealogy of essentialism and the difference between contemporary and traditional 
essentialism I recommend Wilkins (2013) and Witt (1980) respectively. 
7 The BSC excludes both fossil organisms and asexually reproducing taxa from forming species. In addition, it 
assumes that hybridization produces sterile offspring, but there are known cases of fertile hybrids such as the tuco-
tuco resulting from the cross-breeding of female Ctenomys minutus and male Ctenomys lami or hybrid orchids 
resulting from naturally crossed Epidendrum fulgens and Epidendrum puniceolutem.  
8 In fact, the idea seems to be anchored in Darwin’s own thought who seemed to be a species antirealist. He 
believed that the distinction between species and varieties was purely arbitrary and that in so far as natural 
selection was the only process governing taxonomic differences there was no reason to believe in the existence of 
a realist species concept. More on the debate over the ontological status of the species category in Ereshefsky 
(2010c). 
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who expanded the SAIC theory to the historical kind concept of species. Ghiselin would argue 
against the reality of the species concept arguing that classes are incapable of evolving because 
they are abstract entities which are said to possess immutable essences. If species evolve and 
mutate, they must be individuals, since individuality is a necessary condition for change. Thus, 
if Darwin was correct and species evolve, species must be individuals. Moreover, “multiplicity 
does not suffice to render an entity a mere class” (Ghiselin, 1974: 536). The logical treatment 
of species in terms of individuals would make Ghiselin deny essentialism to the point of 
questioning relational notions such as Mayr's BSC. Not only he argues that species do not have 
intrinsic essences but that they lack any essence at all. If species are individuals they cannot be 
defined by a list of necessary and sufficient properties, neither intrinsic or extrinsic. Simply 
put, insofar as it was an accident that the class of mammals gave rise to horses or echidnas 
relational accounts of species pose properties that are accidental and therefore not necessary. 
Hull would argue in a similar way stating that if species vary over time mutation would render 
internal properties contingent making them susceptible of being modified during speciation. 
This would lead Hull to embrace Ghiselin’s theory claiming that species and higher taxa must 
be individuals insofar as they are spatio-temporally restricted entities. Species are recognizable 
as evolutionary units because they share certain traits, traits that become prominent on a given 
species by selection. Genetic hereditary relations require lineages to be causally and hence 
spatiotemporally connected. Selection causes traits to become prominent in species only if that 
trait is passed down. So, if species evolve and change they must be spatiotemporally continuous 
historical entities.  
 
2.2 Is the SAIC theory truly relevant? 
 
The consequences of endorsing the SAIC theory are several and yet I believe its benefits are 
unclear. One of the most cited implications of species individualism is that there cannot be 
scientific laws about particular entities. Hull himself embraced this consequence as a positive 
contribution of his theory. He stated that one of the main reasons that lead him to differentiate 
species as historical entities from natural kinds is the different role that each of these categories 
plays in science. According to Hull in the classical analysis “Scientific laws are supposed to be 
spatiotemporally unrestricted generalizations. No ineliminable reference can be made in 
genuine law of nature to a spatiotemporally individuated entity.” (Hull, 1978: 337). The 
distinction is key to understand the difference between genuine laws of nature such as 
Newton’s law of universal gravitation, and evolutionary generalizations like “all organisms in 
dry habitats develop water conserving mechanisms” which happen to be accidentally true. At 
first glance the idea that laws of nature cannot make reference to individual entities may seem 
like a satisfactory conclusion since there seems to be no universal generalizations in biology 
that apply to particular species. However, I think this conclusion is hasty and fails to appreciate 
how models of scientific laws operate. Let me explain: 
The idea reverberating through Hull’s thought is that scientists dedicate themselves to 
discovering the regularities that govern nature theorizing them as laws that operate at the level 
of physics. I believe this idea to be only half right. It is true that one of the main, (if not the 
fundamental) purposes of scientific practice is to formulate generalizations of natural patterns 
that allow us to give causal explanations and make inductive predictions about the world. But 
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we should not fall into the error of extrapolating the model of physics to other scientific 
disciplines like biology, sociology, or psychology. Such a model stems from the classical 
idealization of universality and reducibility of natural laws to axiomatic theoretical systems. 
Philosophers like Nancy Cartwright (1980, 1983) and Marc Lange (1993) have challenged the 
Newtonian idea that the universe is an organized system governed by exceptionless regularities. 
In particular, Cartwright argues that scientific laws are not exceptionless generalizations but 
statements describing causal processes that operate in highly localized scenarios. That’s why 
scientists formulate them as ceteris paribus generalizations in which a given system turns out 
to be a certain way other things being equal. But if this is so, scientific laws such as Newton’s 
gravitational principle are not true laws, for if we drop the ceteris paribus clause, we drop the 
exceptionless component9, “[T]he fundamental laws of physics do not describe true facts about 
reality. Rendered as descriptions of facts, they are false amended to be true, they lose their 
fundamental, explanatory force.” (Cartwright, 1983: 54). Nevertheless, scientific laws are not 
less explanatory for not being exceptionless, moreover it is precisely the ceteris paribus clause 
that renders them explanatory. The universe has a certain order, yet contrary to what it was 
thought to be, it is local, more diverse and less absolute. 
Now if we go back to the no-reference-to-individuals objection, laws of nature make claims 
about how certain objects of the world, such as celestial bodies or elementary particles behave. 
It is a central requirement of scientific explanations that reference can be made to how these 
concrete objects of the world behave (or should behave) under certain circumstances. 
Biological generalizations regarding evolutive behavior provide good instances of such 
explanatory laws. That the typical formula of the fundamental laws of physics is general does 
not restrict the fact that their scope could be particular. LaPorte (2004) offers a good example 
when quoting Lange’s (1995) point of how on Dirac’s conjecture the constant of gravitational 
force is inversely proportional to the time since the Big Bang. Clearly such a claim would 
require reference to a particular and restricted time. What is relevant here is that  “Dirac’s 
conjecture may be false, but it's hardly apparent that because it refers to particular time it could 
not have been a law.” (LaPorte, 2004: 14). Thus, it seems precipitate to conclude that it follows 
from the very nature of laws that scientific laws could not refer to particular individuals. 
Besides, we should not forget that even if Hull’s point is correct, it does not follow that 
biological species are in fact individuals. As LaPorte argues it could very well be the case that 
biological taxa are natural kinds without fundamental laws, and still the explanatory 
requirement would remain intact.  
To close up I want to mention two further points regarding the SAIC theory. First of all, it 
seems to me that Ghiselin’s thesis that natural kinds cannot undergo any change because they 
are abstract concepts is a poorly thought objection. Upon reflection it should be clear that when 
we talk about Archaeopteryx having evolved into organisms of the Confuciusornis family we 
are not referring to the natural kind “Archaeopteryx” in the abstract sense. What we mean is 
that some members of the species Archaeopteryx underwent some speciation process that made 
them evolve into a new type of organism that classifies into a new species kind. In other words, 
concrete members of a species kind came into existence after old instances of another species 
 
9 Carwright (1980) argues that the Newtonian gravitational principle is not an exceptionless regularity because, 
as most scientific principles, it is true only in ideal isolated systems. The principle states that the force between 
two bodies is equal to the product of their masses divided by the distance between them squared (F = Gmm′/r2 ). 
However, this force is influenced by other several properties like their charge.  
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kind underwent mutation. Second, and more importantly, as Wilson (1999) and LaPorte (2004) 
argue, even if Ghiselin and Hull are wrong, and species are not individuals, there is really no 
need to refute the SAIC theory, for species-individual talk can be translated to species-kind 
talk. To understand this, let's take a look at LaPorte’s argument:  There is a kind for every 
property regardless of what property that is, and it is the possession of that property that 
determines kindness. This may initially sound like a regressive point, but it is not. An easy 
example: the property of being wooden determines wood-kindness in that possession of that 
property is linked to the kind “wood”. In other words, the individual spatio-temporally 
restricted wooden entities that are members of the wood-kind are so in virtue of the essential 
mark that is to possess the property of woodness. Now setting aside artificial kinds and focusing 
on individual-species, there is a property for each individual that determines membership to 
that individual-kind, since for every property there is a corresponding kind regardless of how 
trivial that kind is. Applied to species there is a property for every species-individual that 
determines species-kindness in virtue of which individual entities possessing that property are 
members of a species-kind. So, in the end talk about species as individuals could be 
reconstructed as talk about species as kinds and the SAIC theory is of little relevance to the 
species as natural kinds debate. 
 
3. New Biological Essentialism 
 
Despite the intuitive criticisms of traditional anti-essentialists, after the Kripkean and 
Putnamian revolution several authors have tried to resurrect biological essentialism based on 
current research programs. These programs are grouped into what is known as the extended 
evolutionary synthesis, a group of different research lines that examine additional causative 
factors beyond genetics10. Philosophers of the new biological essentialism have focused their 
attention on how processes such as embryonic development, the influence of ecological factors, 
construction of niches, reproductivity between individuals, evolutionary history and ancestor 
lineages could explain the common characteristics that differentiate species. Since these new 
taxonomic approaches did not explain evolutionary development in strictly genetic or intrinsic 
terms, many authors have rethought the possibility of accepting essentialism defining essences 
as non-intrinsic relational properties. Still, others have remained faithful to the core ideas of 
traditional essentialism defending the causal-explanatory relevance of internal mechanisms in 
speciation processes. In this section I will review some of the most relevant theses of these new 
biological essentialisms, as well as the criticisms they have faced. 
  
 
10 Some of these non-genetic factors are multilevel selection (the idea that natural selection operates at the group 
level rather than at the individual level), transgenerational epigenetic inheritance (chain transmission of 
epigenetic markers from parent organisms to child organisms that affects the traits of offspring without alteration 
of the DNA), evolutionary developmental biology (molecular analysis of embryology and comparison of 
developmental mechanisms in biological organisms to infer ancestry relationships), and the evolutionary influence 
of ecological factors such as ecosystems or the creation of niches. 
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3.1 The rise of relational essentialism 
 
According to relational essentialism organisms belonging to different species are defined by a 
series of extrinsic relations that they share with members of their taxa. Relational approaches 
rescued the essentialist idea that there are lists of necessary and sufficient conditions delimiting 
boundaries between species. However, defining these conditions in terms of relation based 
species concepts avoids the classic anti-essentialist criticism offering the possibility to 
accommodate biological variation as well as the different taxonomic schools. Transferring 
essences to extrinsic properties such as being descendant of a particular ancestor, being part of 
an interbreeding population, or occupying a particular ecological niche fits in with post-
Darwinian taxonomy. But as we will see this comes at great cost, namely that of abandoning 
the causal-explanatory role of essential properties. Of course, there is also the further debate 
about which type of classification theory is the most appropriate, or if, on the contrary, biology 
should move past beyond the monistic attempt to identify a single correct species concept 
adopting a pluralistic approach11. Nonetheless, these are questions regarding the adequacy and 
explanatory functionality of our taxonomic approach, truth is that regardless of which position 
we decide to embrace, monistic or pluralistic, relational essentialism can, in principle, account 
for both. 
 
Okasha's a-causal relational essentialism: 
Okasha’s article Darwinian Metaphysics: Species and the Question of Essentialism has already 
become a classic for being one of the first articles to analyze relational essentialism in light of 
the semantic theories of Kripke and Putnam. In his paper Okasha emphasizes an idea that is 
important to understand the essentialisms that derived from this theories, namely the idea that 
essential properties must play a semantic and causal-explanatory role. For example, in the case 
of water, the property of being composed of two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen is what 
determines both the macrostructural properties shared by all true samples of water and the 
reference of the natural kind term “water”. Intrinsic essentialism places these two roles in the 
microstructural properties of natural kinds, the atomic structure of gold is the property that 
determines surface characteristics such as color, melting temperature or its malleability, as well 
as the extension of the term “gold”. The immediate idea that comes to mind when considering 
the strategy of a relational essentialist is to replace this hidden structure  with relational 
properties of the type mentioned above. However, Okasha cautions, this only half saves the 
Kripkean/Putnamian essentialist model, for relational properties are unable to account for the 
causal processes that led organisms of certain species to possess certain traits. Whatever 
approach we take, phylogenetic, morphological, ecological or interbreeding, none of these 
properties meets the causal-explanatory role. Organisms belonging to the species of Equus 
 
11 Pluralism argues that the monistic project of species is fundamentally wrong and that the progress of modern 
evolutionary synthesis shows us that the question is not about which concept is correct, rather it concerns the 
question of how legitimate the different species concepts are. For different versions of pluralism I recommend 
reading Kitcher (1984), Dupré (1993) and Ereshefsky (2001). 
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quagga (plains zebra) share a number of relational properties such as inhabiting treeless 
grasslands and savanna woodlands, being highly social, nomadic and non-territorial, having 
evolved from a common ancestor, and being able to interbreed. But none of these properties 
explains why common zebras have stripes. However, Okasha argues, there is no a priori reason 
to believe that the same property should play both roles. Such a notion of natural kindness is 
extrapolated from chemical kinds like gold in which having atomic no. 79 play’s both the role 
of determining something being gold and explaining why all the samples of gold share 12. But 
there is no reason why the same should happen with biological kinds. 
 
It is perfectly possible that the extension of a kind term should be determined not by 
superficial characteristics but by “something else”, just as Kripke and Putnam say, 
without it being true that that “something else” causally explains the presence of the 
superficial characteristics. Simply because atomic structure performs both roles in the 
case of chemical elements does not mean that the two roles must always be played by 
the same thing. And if we apply the Kripke/Putnam model to biological species in the 
way I have recommended – by replacing Kripke’s and Putnam’s “hidden structure” 
with whatever relational property we think determines species membership – we do 
sever the semantic and causal/explanatory roles. (Okasha: 2002: 203) 
 
However, things do not end here. Okasha does not only sever the semantic and causal-
explanatory roles, he goes even further claiming that we should abandon the idea that 
classificatory concepts in biology must be relevant when making inductive predictions. This 
idea, he says, is valid in disciplines like chemistry where the causal and semantic roles are co-
instantiated, but in disciplines such as biology where this does not occur, this account of what 
determines the value of scientific classifications is not necessarily adequate. 
I disagree, and I think the reason why Okasha claims this is that his attempt to replace the 
hidden structure with relational essences places him in a dilemma. If species have relational 
essences that do not play any inductive causal-explanatory role it follows that either (1) 
formulated in such a way species do not have any scientific value, or (2) scientific 
generalizations do not determine the value of a species concept. Okasha bites the bullet and 
goes for the second horn of the dilemma disguising the first by the fact that it seems strange to 
affirm that the concept of species does not have any scientific value, this would go against 
taxonomic practices. But it seems even stranger to state that without any causal-explanatory 
power something could be considered a scientific concept. Isn’t it precisely the purpose of 
taxonomy to make predictive generalizations that allow us to group organisms under the same 
species concept? The dilemma only occurs because Okasha deprives essential properties of the 
explanatory requirement. Ereshefsky criticizes this point arguing that “if the relations that serve 
 
12 In an unpublished article Gorriñobeaskoa (2019) expands upon Okasha’s point arguing that the causal-
explanatory factor of the internal mechanisms of chemical kinds such as gold are not as clear as one might initially 
imagine. It might seem that the atomic structure of gold is what determines its surface characteristics, however 
the color of gold is due to a special property of electrons that in turn depends on the atomic structure. This property 
determines in which orbit and in which order electrons are placed around the nucleus, causing them to absorb and 
refract certain spectra of light. 
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as the identity conditions for a taxon are not central in explaining the typical traits among a 
taxon’s members, then such relations are not essences” (Ereshefsky, 2010: 683). Okasha’s 
essentialism is empty of essences because it lacks the causal role that characterizes 
essentialism. Devitt is on the same line of attack, he rejects relational essentialism for being 
unable to answer the causal question of traits, Why do members of species S typically have trait 
T? Explanations that merely cite relations may explain how a trait is maintained across the 
members of a species, but are insufficient when it comes to explaining why zebras typically 
have stripes. Essences, understood as relations do not suffice. 
 
LaPorte’s historical essentialism: 
Linked to his critiques of species individualism LaPorte (2004) has proposed that species are 
defined by historical essences. LaPorte draws upon the phylogenetic concept of species arguing 
that ancestry relations are the real essential properties of biological taxa13. The difference with 
Okasha’s essentialism is that historical essences are what render species kind causally 
explanatory as compared to other natural kinds. He argues that the naturalness of a kind consists 
in its explanatory value, thus amending the objection posed against Okasha14. It is precisely 
because natural kinds have explanatory value and are inductively useful that they provide the 
basis of scientific classification. Adducing to historical properties allows us to explain 
biological similarities between Ursus maritimus (polar bears) and Ursus arctos (brown bears) 
in genealogical terms. In the same way, it allows us to explain why polar bears are able to swim 
long distances in icy water while brown bears aren’t. The explanation is evolutionary in the 
sense that some organisms in the previous bear population survived better than other members 
of the same species because they could swim in icy water. This in turn provides a satisfactory 
explanation of the genetic inheritance that caused the trait to perpetuate in the lineage. Simply 
put, under LaPorte’s account the essence of a species is its location in the evolutionary tree. 
The members of a given species must have the relevant relations to their ancestors, and it is 
this evolutionary history that allows us to explain the important shared features associated with 
members of species.  
 
Kripke and Putnam wrongly suppose that [...] “internal structure” is what binds the 
members of a biological kind like species into a common kind. In general [...] biologists 
do not delimit species and other taxa on the basis of intrinsic properties like these. 
Biologists generally place organisms into taxa on the basis of shared ancestry [...] This 
error about how to characterize the essences of taxa can nevertheless be easily 
remedied, as I have suggested in earlier chapters. Given that biological kinds are 
delimited historically, the essences of kinds simply become historical. (LaPorte, 2004: 
64) 
 
13 Phylogenetics, also known as cladistics, addresses species from the point of view of evolutionary history and 
ancestry relations. The hereditary traits of species are explained in terms of lineage and genetic inheritance and 
give rise to phylogenetic trees that show the evolutionary relationships of different species. 
14 LaPorte holds that natural kindness comes in degrees and varies in function of the explanatory value of particular 
kinds. In certain contexts, terms like “green”, “trash” or “toothpaste” are said to constitute natural kinds with 
certain explanatory value, whereas in other “fairly strict contexts” they don't.  
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The main advantage of historical essentialism is that it accounts for species historicity and 
evolutionary change while keeping the explanatory requirement. Moreover, nothing prevents 
the defender of the SAIC theory from embracing such a conception of species, since, as we 
saw, is compatible with the thesis that species are individuals. However, there are also problems 
with LaPorte’s approach for historical essentialism presupposes that species are lineages and 
that their evolutionary history is an uninterrupted continuity. Yet, this is false, species do not 
constitute lineages themselves, but rather they are segments of the lineages. Breaks in the 
lineages determine phylogenetic trees, these ruptures occur in the speciation processes in which 
the essential properties resulting from the ontogenetic processes arise. Those properties are the 
ones defining the membership to different species of same lineages. At some point in history 
some members of Ursus etruscus ceased to be members of that taxa becoming members of the 
new Ursus arctos, from which later on Ursus maritimus evolved. However, the same lineage 
splitted giving rise to Ailuropodinae, better known as the panda bear. Historical essentialism 
cannot account for the segmentation of lineages for it classifies only in terms of ancestry 
relations. It lacks the explanatory power that ontogenetic mechanisms bring to our theory. 
Relations provide information about the external conditions that triggered the speciation 
processes, but they do not explain how they occur. LaPorte's historical essentialism too falls 
prey to Devitt's causal question of traits, historical essentialism is informative rather than 
explanatory. Something else is needed, namely reference to the internal processes that cause 
speciation. 
 
3.2 The return of intrinsic essentialism 
 
Michael Devitt is surely the person who has contributed most to reigniting the debate about the 
death of essentialism. In an article appropriately titled Resurrecting Biological Essentialism, 
Devitt argued that it is crucial to differentiate between two questions when considering 
essentialism: “What is it to be a member of any group that happens to be a species?” and “What 
is it for a group to be a species?” (Devitt: 2008: 349). Relational approaches have to do with 
the second question, whereas essentialism has to do with the first, and it is precisely the 
conflation between these two questions what has lead so many philosophers to reject 
essentialism in pursuit of a more relational theory. Biologists group organisms under certain 
labels depending on particular generalizations, these generalizations can be morphological, 
behavioral, ecological, etc. but Devitt reminds us:  
 
Generalizations of this kind demand an explanation. Why are they so? Why, for 
example, is there this difference between the Indian and African rhinos? Such questions 
could, of course be seeking an explanation of the evolutionary history that led to the 
generalization being true. Set that aside for a moment. The questions could also be 
seeking an explanation of what makes the generalization true. Regardless of the history 
of its coming to be true in virtue of what is it now true? What are the mechanisms? 
(Devitt: 2008: 352) 
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Devitt points out a difference that is crucial, the difference between what led to the 
generalization being true and what makes the generalization true. Relational explanations 
answer the question of what led the species of Rhinoceros unicornis (Indian rhinos) to develop 
a single horn while the Cheratotherium simun (African rhinos) developed two. As we 
previously saw explanations that refer to relational factors lack causal-explanatory value, they 
are only informative and as such they are not complete explanations. After all, when we ask 
ourselves why African rhinos have two horns, we are not interested in knowing their relations 
of ancestry, evolutionary history or the ecological niches that they inhabit. Rather, we are 
interested in knowing what mechanisms are causing this species to develop such a 
characteristic. In other words, the relevant question has to do with what are the genetic bases 
and ontogenetic processes that lead an adult African rhino to have two horns. If we focus only 
on relational factors we lose the explanatory force. Causal explanations are structural, while 
relational factors constitute historical explanations. The problem with Okasha’s and LaPorte’s 
essentialism is that they confuse structural explanations with historical ones. But “at bottom, 
structural explanations will advert to essential intrinsic, probably largely genetic, properties” 
(Devitt, 2008: 354). 
The most important criticism to Devitt is offered by Ereshefsky (2010a). Ereshefsky is 
sympathetic to Devitt's critique of relational essentialism. He also considers that to understand 
correctly why species share biological generalities it is necessary to pay attention to the 
ontogenetic mechanisms that give rise to these particularities. Otherwise we would not be 
looking at the causal factors that explain the possession of those traits. However, Ereshefsky 
considers that this does not necessarily imply any essentialism. The criticism is simple, there 
may be organisms of a species that lack this internal mechanisms, that do not possess the 
necessary genes or go through the stage of embryonic development required to form a specific 
trait, and yet they would still be members of that species. In its embryonic state zebras have an 
ontogenetic mechanism that causes them to develop stripes. That mechanism is hardly a 
necessary nor sufficient condition for membership to the species of Equus quagga, since 
members of this species may lack the cited mechanism that causes the trait to appear. And, 
more importantly, this ontogenetic mechanism is not unique, other mammals such as cats also 
have it. Thus, the internal mechanisms that cause biological traits to appear do not coincide 
with species boundaries. Another important point is that “relations are explanatory prior in 
explaining taxon identity, not intrinsic properties” (Ereshefsky, 2010: 681). Despite the fact 
that internal mechanisms play a relevant role in explaining certain characteristics, relationships 
are more fundamental. Zebras may fail to have the ontogenetic mechanism that causes them to 
be striped, but they gene pool could not have been other as well as they could not have failed 
to belong to one species lineage. However, this does not force us to embrace relational 
essentialism, since, as we saw, relations fail to offer explanatory answers. The obvious 
conclusion is to reject essentialism.  
I think Ereshefsky's criticism is misguided and aims in the wrong direction. I grant the claim 
that Devitt’s internal mechanisms are not stable enough to be considered essences in the 
traditional sense. But that is precisely the point of his new biological essentialism. He does not 
intend to postulate a single property or mechanism that fulfills the role of traditional essences, 
that would fall back on the error of pre-Darwinian biology. Instead this new biological 
essentialism postulates essences as sets or clusters of properties that vary through history 
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causing species to develop the traits by which they are typically characterized. The disjunctive 
set of these properties is what constitutes the essence of a species kind. 
 
[...] it seems as if the consensus should be simply that the crude idea that there is, say, 
“a tiger gene” is wrong. But to reject that crudity is not to reject the idea that a certain 
cluster or pattern of underlying, largely genetic, properties is common and peculiar to 
tigers. So my third main point in defense of Intrinsic Biological Essentialism is: an 
intrinsic essence does not have to be “neat and tidy”. (Devitt, 2008: 371) 
 
Two things are relevant in this excerpt. The first we just mentioned, anti-essentialists seem to 
be anchored in the idea that essences have to be monadic properties, but they need not. If 
biology intends to make metaphysics properly, it must go beyond traditional essentialism. If 
we understand essences as disjunctive sets of various co-occurring properties, biological 
variability does not pose an insurmountable problem and much of the anti-essentialist rejection 
fades. The anti-essentialist has no reason beyond metaphysical prejudices for not accepting 
essences. They may push the point further claiming that they do not consider clusters of 
variable properties as full-on essences, however the discussion here is terminological. Whether 
they want to call them essences or not they have to agree that it is a set of internal properties 
and ontogenetic mechanisms that lead the members of the zebra species to share a series of 
biological characteristics. If we can accommodate by the notion of disjunctive cluster the fact 
that some of these properties do not manifest or occur across various taxa, there is no reason to 
abandon the idea. Yet someone could argue that this weakens the notion of essence as applied 
to natural kinds that Kripke/Putnam essentialism promotes. Besides, although the anti-
essentialist concedes, it could be claimed that it is still difficult for Devitt to delimit which 
properties constitute the variable and disjunctive set. This connects with second point, the claim 
that intrinsic essences do not have to be neat and tidy.  
The way I see it there are two possible answers. First there is the obvious answer that the 
question of what is the essence of a natural kind is an empirical and epistemological question. 
When we appeal to natural kinds such as gold or water we do so because our scientific 
knowledge has reached a degree of sophistication such that it allows us to carve nature at its 
joints. That we have not reached such a degree of sophistication in biology is not necessarily 
an indicator that what we seek does not exist. This only points to an epistemic gap in our 
understanding, not to a metaphysical deficiency in our theory. After all, the complexity of 
biological organisms is an epistemological factor to consider, we must not forget that we are 
dealing with the intricacy of life itself. Moreover, the development of molecular biology and 
contemporary research programs such as the genome project aim precisely at the resolution of 
these gaps. The second position, towards which I incline, is more interesting and is linked to 
LaPorte, who holds that essences are not discovered, but stipulated. According to Kripke and 
Putnam, as science advances, essences are discovered and scientists correct the misuse of 
natural kind terms. However, the discovery of essences does not change the meaning of the 
terms. LaPorte disagrees, his objection is that natural kind terms are not associated with a single 
hidden structure that scientist discover and baptize, instead kinds are associated with a number 
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of such theoretical criteria15. As science advances, some of these criteria are discarded as 
inadequate, “but this is by fiat, not discovery” (LaPorte, 1998: 50). Accordingly, there is a 
constant component of indeterminacy and vagueness in the way we determine the extension of 
our natural kind terms to the entities of the world. The conclusion is that natural kind terms are 
not connected to a specifiable essence, instead they are associated with an indeterminate cluster 
from which some characteristics are theoretically and progressively discarded16. 
 
4. The HPC theory 
 
Now that we have seen both sides of the essentialist debate I want to introduce a theory that I 
think has been too easily dismissed and can offer a solution to the problems of relational 
essentialism as well as a greater concretion of the Devittean proposal. Richard Boyd’s HPC 
theory of natural kinds. My intention is to argue that intrinsic essentialism can be easily 
accommodated within Boyd's theory of natural kinds offering us a better theoretical framework 
that accounts for the intrinsic essentialist intuitions. However, the theory faces some problems 
that threaten the project. In the next sections I will argue that these problems, despite not being 
fatal pose major complications. This complications can be saved but at the risk of sacrificing 
the explanatory power that we seek. The solution I suggest is to reinterpret Boyd's theory, 
abandoning the homeostatic assumption. 
 
4.1 Homeostatic mechanisms, property clusters and relations 
 
The HPC theory was presented by Boyd (1999) under the influence of the causal theory of 
reference. The development of Kripke and Putnam's semantic theories pointed to a realistic 
notion of science. Expanding upon the notion of property clusters we could say that the HPC 
theory characterizes natural kinds as clusters of co-occurring properties underpinned by 
homeostatic mechanisms that cause and sustain the property clusters. Species members share 
many, but not necessarily all, properties that are the product of various relational mechanisms, 
such as sharing a common ancestor, sharing an ecological niche, gene exchange, or common 
developmental mechanisms. Thus, the HPC theory retains the requirement of causal similarity 
of intrinsic essentialism while accounting for the relational mechanisms that perpetuate the 
appearance of those mechanisms. At the same time the view allows for the possibility of 
intraspecies variability as in the case of stripeless zebras. There are three virtues to the HPC 
theory:  
First, it accounts for the heterogeneity of the natural world. Unlike traditional essentialism, the 
HPC theory is flexible, it does not require a closed set of properties that identify and define 
organisms as a members of a natural kinds. The property cluster is flexible enough to allow 
membership conditions without the need to postulate a particular set of properties. This enables 
 
15 One of the main consequences around which LaPorte's work revolves is that if the essence of a natural kinds is 
stipulated rather than discovered the meaning of natural kind terms do change.  
16 I thank professor Díaz-León for drawing my attention to this last point. 
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the HPC theory to adequately accommodate Devitt's thesis of disjunctive sets. The essentialist 
notion of necessity deflates in favor of the adequacy of the theory. As Wilson, Barker, and 
Bringandt (2007) indicate “Each kind member necessarily instantiates some subset of the 
properties that typically cluster together. [...] not just one particular subset of properties in an 
individuative cluster is sufficient for kind membership.” (Wilson  et al. 2007: 197). This 
metaphysical flexibility allows for variability in the instantiation of particular properties, thus 
accommodating Ereshefsky's criticism. It remains for scientific determination that the property 
subset is so causally relevant as to be taken into account. This will have to do with the 
explanatory virtues and the predictive power of this subset of properties. 
The second virtue is scientific. Boyd claims that what is at stake in establishing the reliability 
of inductive and explanatory practices and what representation of phenomena in terms of 
natural kinds makes possible is the accommodation of our inferential practices to the relevant 
causal structures. We are able to identify generalizations in science because we are able to 
accommodate our inductive practices to the causal factors that sustain them. Otherwise stated, 
our ability to make inductive generalizations is due to the fact that we presuppose certain causal 
factors that determine the phenomenon being observed. When describing and explaining these 
generalizations we need a vocabulary that adapts to the causal structure that we presuppose in 
our inductions. This lexicon is constituted by the natural kind terms. Boyd stands with LaPorte 
in that the naturalness of a natural kind is its suitability for explanation and induction. This, as 
he points out, is remarkably observable in our generalizations about chemical kinds. When we 
add sodium salt to a flame we observe that it turns yellow and we generalize that all sodium 
salt produces a yellow flame when burnt. The natural kind terms used in this generalization 
help us identify the causal relationships that hold up our inductive generalizations. That we 
know that an organism O is a member of Ceratotherium simum allows us to predict that it will 
have two horns among other things. The case of biological species would only be a special and 
particularly complex case of these generalizations where we have not had sufficient inductive 
success to clearly identify all the relevant causal structures. However, that we are not able to 
make the inductive generalizations required due to the epistemological difficulty imposed by 
complex cases such as borderline species does not imply that the causal structure does not exist, 
but that we have not been able to access it.  
Finally, the HPC theory does not necessarily imply essentialism17, but it is highly compatible 
with it. The HPC theory, I argue, is a form of lowered essentialism in that HPC kinds play the 
inductive and causal-explanatory roles that traditional intrinsic essentialism attributes to 
essences. Additionally, HPC kinds consist of entities that share sets of properties induced by 
that kind's homeostatic mechanism. This mechanisms are responsible of the similarities found 
among the members of that kind. Thus, the HPC theory provides a more fine grained account 
of biological species than brute essentialisms. HPC kinds need not have a common essential 
property, what is essential is the co-instantiation of a variety of properties, so traditional 
criticism is avoided. Furthermore, the theory allows external relations to play a significant role 
in inducing similarity among the members of a species kind. Whereas raw intrinsic essentialism 
assumes that essences are monadic internal properties such as the atomic structure of gold or 
 
17 In fact, authors like Martinez (2017) suggest that one of the virtues of the HPC theory is that it makes room for 
inductive generalizations without the need to postulate intrinsic essences. 
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the DNA of tigers. The HPC theory is more inclusive, it recognizes that both internal 
mechanisms and external relations are important causes of the species similarities.  
 
4.2 Circularity, the challenge of polymorphism and ICPC kinds 
 
But not everything is perfect, as anticipated the HPC theory is not without criticism. Anti-
essentialists are persistent and have highlighted some problems with Boyd’s proposal. Here I 
shall mention two, which I consider are the most pressing objections. The first is posed by 
Ereshefsky (2010a) and stresses the indeterminability of the mechanisms of the particular HPC 
kinds:  
 
The members of an HPC kind can have a cluster of co-occurring similarities that vary 
at a time and over time. And HPC theory allows that the causal homeostatic mechanisms 
that cause such similarities can vary at a time and over time. Thus HPC theory is 
consistent with the variability found in species. But if the homeostatic mechanisms of 
a HPC kind vary at a time and over time, how do we decide which mechanisms are the 
mechanisms of a particular HPC kind? (Ereshefsky, 2010a: 677) 
 
It seems that unless one is very strict on how to individuate the property clusters and their 
underlying causes the theory has a problem in determining how many properties are enough to 
consider an entity a natural kind. Ereshefsky points out that one way to determine properties 
could be to look for those mechanisms that cause the appearance of a stable cluster of 
similarities associated with the natural kinds. But if the similarities are variable as the HPC 
theorist argues the argument is regressive. That said, Ereshefsky proposes a way out of the 
circle that leads the essentialist to a dead end. In determining which organisms and internal 
mechanisms belong to a particular species we need to focus on phylogenetic inheritance and 
ancestry relations. “Genealogy is the glue that binds the various organisms and their 
mechanisms with a particular taxon.” (Ereshefsky, 2010: 677). The problems with this 
approach are the following. First, it leans the HPC theory toward LaPorte's historical 
essentialism inheriting its criticisms. Second and as Ereshefsky clarifies, the historical 
approach abandons the main reason why the HPC theory was formulated namely to account 
for the internal mechanisms that characterize natural kinds in terms of similarity. If the 
classifying factor becomes phylogenetic and ancestry relations gain explanatory primacy, we 
abandon internal similarity. 
I disagree with the implications of this problem. To begin with, I don't see why HPC theorist 
has to abandon the similarity thesis in favor of relational factors. It is true that relational 
properties such as the ability to interbreed, sharing a common ancestor or genetic inheritance 
help us to identify the ontogenetic mechanisms that cause similarity. However, similarity 
remains capital when it comes to the causal-explanatory factors of the traits found among the 
members of a species kind. Also, the similarity of this clustered properties is still what allows 
us to make the inferential generalizations that account for the structure of those causal factors. 
The point is made clear by Wilson et al. “Such individuative features of species promote the 
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species evolution, but also promote phenotypic unity among species members, which conforms 
the desideratum that an appropriate notion of a natural kind ought to yield kinds with natural 
integrity.” (Wilson et al. 2007: 210). A second consideration derived from this criticism is that 
Ereshefsky seems to believe that by focusing in both internal mechanisms and property clusters 
the HPC approach denies that species are historical entities. This is just false, the HPC theory 
does not commit to biological species being historical individuals, but insofar as the property 
clusters are sustained by means of external relations its analysis of natural kinds is compatible 
with them being so. Polar bears and brown bears are species of the same lineage that share a 
gene pool. Such relational factors are what led these two species to share a number of properties 
in their corresponding property clusters. Additionally, it is also the case that variations in 
external factors such as the genetic pressure exerted by isolation during glaciation forced 
natural selection leading to speciation. 
The second criticism is perhaps the most mentioned in the discussions about HPC kinds, 
namely its inability to properly account for stable polymorphism. The HPC theory is on par 
with the classical theories of natural kinds in that delimits natural kinds through the possession 
of shared similarities among members of a kind. Under this account particular instances of 
HPC kinds will share a number of relevant properties clustered by homeostatic mechanisms. 
However, the centrality of the concept of homeostasis and shared similarities prevents the 
theory from accounting for the stable polymorphisms that we find in different species such as 
sexual dimorphism in mammals. This criticism was posed by Ereshefsky & Matthen (2005) 
who argued that in addition to being homeostatic, species are also heterostatic. This means that 
in addition to the stable similarity induced by internal homeostatic mechanisms, species are 
also defined by a recurrent variability product of other mechanisms labelled heterostatic. They 
accuse Boyd’s theory of privileging similarity explanations over phenotypical polymorphism 
and explicitly argue for the need to incorporate additional mechanisms that account for stable 
morphic variability within species. 
 
A proper approach to taxonomy must recognize such differences. Moreover it should 
explore the relations that produce and maintain differences. So in addition to Boyd’s 
“homeostatic” mechanisms we need to recognize “heterotic” mechanisms that produce 
variation, and “heterostatic” mechanisms that maintain it. (Ereshefsky & Matthen, 
2005: 10) 
 
The solution I suggest is provided by Martinez (2015) who explains why the usual HPC 
approach to polymorphism would not suffice to answer the question, and thus, the theory must 
be modified. According to him, the HPC theorist could rebut the objection arguing that we 
should think of polymorphisms as cases of imperfect homeostasis. However, despite being 
imperfect similarity still prevails in such a degree that we can differentiate and classify the 
members that present morphic variabilities within a species kind. In other words, polymorphic 
organisms are not distinct enough to threaten the integrity of the HPC theory. As we saw the 
HPC theory allows variability and polymorphic species share enough properties of the cluster 
to be considered HPC kinds. If this is so then why does Martinez consider it a bad solution? 
The problem with the solution is that it sacrifices explanatory power in pursuit of 
accommodation making “polymorphism indistinguishable from, say, mere statistical 
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phenotypic variation” (Martinez, 2015: 4). Ereshefsky and Matthew argue that this is a major 
stumbling block. Martinez and I are more optimistic, we believe that the problem of 
hetereostasis points to a potential improvement of the HPC theory. 
The solution is to reinterpret property clusters so that they can articulate this ‘stable, discrete 
phenotypic variability’ as well as the similarity among polymorphic species. The mistake is in 
assuming that co-instantiation of properties must be in terms of temporal space continuity. In 
order to account for morphic variability we require an informational connection between the 
different properties of the clusters. Reinterpreting co-occurrence in terms of informationally 
connected property clusters (ICPC) allows us to predict the instantiation of property groups. 
Otherwise stated, “instantiations of properties in the cluster of an HPC are signals that carry 
information about instantiations of other properties in the same cluster” (Martinez, 2015: 10). 
The examples provided by Martinez reinforce the explanatory force of the ICPC kinds, in the 
case of caste polyphenism in ants (whether larvae develop into queen, worker or soldier ants) 
the presence of a queen ant signals the presence of soldier and worker ants in the same colony. 
Informational connections hold between properties that are co-instantiated in certain locations 
and other groups of properties that co-occur in different locations, the locations in the second 
group being a function of the ones in the first group18. Translating this to species morphs 
accommodates the problem of polymorphism. Roughly, if we find that a property P1 is 
instantiated in an organism, homeostatic mechanisms increase the probability of a property P2 
being co-instantiated in the same organism. At the same time this increases the probability of 
a property P3 being instantiated within the range of that organism. And P3 increases the 
probability of a property P4 being co-instantiated in the same place. As Martinez indicates the 
result is two informationally connected morphs, one made out of the co-instantiation of P1 and 
P2 and the other made out of the co-instantiation of P3 and P4
19. 
 
4.3 So, is there any essence after all? 
 
Curiously enough Martinez seems to want to move away from the essentialist route that authors 
like Devitt have proposed. He states that the HPC theory provides us with an adequate 
theoretical framework through which to make scientific inferences without the need to 
postulate intrinsic essences. Being so, why defend the applicability of HPC / ICPC kinds to the 
new biological essentialism? The answer recovers part of the reflection that I anticipated in the 
introduction and that I have been doing throughout this article. That is, that we must abandon 
the traditional sense of essence if we want to accommodate an appropriate metaphysics of 
biology. 
Despite so much metaphysical drift my proposal is simple: Essences need not be monadic as 
anti-essentialists seem to assume. Post-Darwinian biology along with the development of 
taxonomic theories has shown that species kind cannot be delimited solely by reference to a 
 
18 We should clarify that although location of the properties can be understood spatio-temporally (as in Martinez’s 
example of the skeletal system) this need not be the case. Informationally understood location can refer to any 
group of properties carrying information of other groups. Certain temperatures for example are informationally 
connected to the presence of some HPC kinds in that they carry informational signals about the probability of 
other properties being present. 
19 Of course co-instantiation of properties in the clusters can include more than two properties. 
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‘hidden structure’ in the way Kripke and Putnam argued. However, relational factors do not 
account for the causal-explanatory role of the properties that cause intraspecies similarity. If 
species are defined by variable sets of relationally determined properties that co-occur in 
homeostatic clusters, these co-occurrence of properties becomes essential. If we can articulate 
the relational factors that determine the clusters, the evolutionary variability and the stable 
polymorphism within our theory making use of the informational connections between the 
properties within the clusters, essentialism is safe from criticism. Yet, someone could argue 
that much of the essentialist appeal has been lost along the way. If the properties that we 
consider essences are variable to the point that it is allowed to alter the conditions of the cluster, 
is there something truly essential in them?  
Once again, such an objection misconceives the nature of our essentialism. What is essential is 
not the particular set of properties that are clustered in a certain entity making it belong to a 
kind. Neither it is the extrinsic factors that determine the clustering of the properties. Rather, 
what is essential is the variable but stable co-occurrence of the properties that determine species 
kindness. Whether you want to call this essentialism or not is of little importance if in the end 
species kinds are defined by some regularly shared set of properties that are causally and 
explanatorily relevant. The ICPC theory expands upon the notion of disjunctive sets of 
properties providing us a way to understand the co-instantiation of properties in terms of 
informational connectedness. This help us to determine the way in which internal properties 
are to be determined offering us a robust and theoretically adequate framework from which to 
defend the new biological essentialism, complementing Devitt's essentialism and sharpening 
Boyd’s theory.  
 
5. Conclusion and corollary 
 
We have come a long way so let's recap. In the first section I introduced the essentialist thesis 
and stressed the importance of distinguishing classical essentialism from the new essentialism 
of natural kinds that Kripke and Putnam inaugurated. I have also advanced the idea that part of 
the anti-essentialist consensus in biology is due to the conflation of the pre-Darwinian concept 
of essence with the analytical one. In section two we presented the traditional anti-essentialism 
of Mayr, Hull and Ghiselin, and we addressed the SAIC theory. I argued that the advantages 
of embracing species individualism are few and its consequences serious. Nonetheless, even if 
one chooses to embrace this theory the essentialist can easily accommodate species-as-
individual talk to species-as-kinds talk. In part three I have presented the two essentialist 
positions, the relational essentialism of Okasha and LaPorte and Devitt's new intrinsic 
essentialism. Two conclusions were drawn: First, relational essentialism, although initially 
closer to modern classificatory practices is insufficient in its defence of essentialism for being 
unable to account for the causal-explanatory role of essential properties. Second, Devitt’s 
revival of intrinsic essentialism modifies the essentialist theses enough to account for the 
variability and historicity of species although this devalues the metaphysical weight of 
essentialism in relation to its classical predecessor.  
Finally, in section four we expanded Devitt's notion of property clusters introducing the HPC 
theory. The theory accommodates an intrinsic Devitt-style essentialism, accounting for the 
internal properties caused by similarities in terms of co-occurrence, simultaneously 
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recognizing the important role of external relations in determining evolutionarily developed 
ontogenetic mechanisms. This, in turn, provides us with a suitable inferential framework for 
our scientific generalizations, accounting for what actually makes natural kinds relevant. 
Namely, their adaptability to the causal structure that we presuppose. However, two anti-
essentialist critiques remained, the explanatory circularity and the problem of polymorphisms. 
Ultimately, we have seen that there is no such circularity, but polymorphism is indeed a major 
obstacle to HPC theory. Nonetheless, I have argued that the problem is not insurmountable, 
and that Ereshefsky and Matthen's demand for heterostatic mechanisms can be properly 
addressed if we broaden the notion of co-instantiation of properties. For this I have argued in 
favor of Martinez's notion of ICPC kinds. This accounts for morphic variability without 
sacrificing explanatory strength, allowing us to articulate a better defense of the new biological 
essentialism. 
Throughout this work I have tried to defend the widely rejected idea that as natural kinds 
species possess essential properties that characterize membership of organisms to biological 
taxa. I also held that if these properties are to be counted as essential, they must be causally 
explanatory of the characteristics typically shared among the members of species. Anti-
essentialism is in part product of the rejection of the metaphysical ghosts that fuelled 
positivism. I believe that if biology intends to keep paths with philosophy it shouldn't be afraid 
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